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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper offers a critical appraisal of the claim of Ritschl (2008) to have found a 
“possible resolution” to what he calls the “Anglo-German industrial productivity 
puzzle”. To understand the origins of this term, it is necessary to describe some recent 
developments in comparisons of industrial labour productivity between Britain and 
Germany. The Anglo-German industrial productivity puzzle really arose as the result 
of a new industrial production index produced by Ritschl (2004), which differed very 
substantially from the widely used index of Hoffmann (1965). Broadberry and Burhop 
(2007) pointed out that if the Ritschl (2004) index is combined with an index of 
German employment from Hoffmann (1965) and time series of UK output and 
employment from Feinstein (1972), it implies an implausibly high German labour 
productivity lead over Britain in 1907, when projected back from a widely accepted 
Germany/UK labour productivity benchmark for 1935/36.  
 
This 1935/36 benchmark was established originally by Rostas (1948), but was 
later reworked by Broadberry and Fremdling (1990), and has recently been further 
reworked by Fremdling et al. (2007a). All three studies, despite their different 
methodologies, agree that labour productivity in British and German industry was 
broadly equal in 1935/36. The finding of substantially higher German labour 
productivity in 1907 when projecting back with the Ritschl (2004) index created a 
puzzle for at least two reasons. First, other comparative information from the pre-
World War I period, such as wages, seems difficult to square with much higher 
German labour productivity at this time. This view can be seen in the earlier work of 
Fremdling (1991), who argued for lower German labour productivity in industry 
during the whole period 1855-1913. But second, a direct benchmark estimate   3
produced by Broadberry and Burhop (2007), using production census information for 
Britain and industrial survey material of similar quality for Germany, suggested 
broadly equal labour productivity in 1907. 
 
Broadberry and Burhop (2007) also showed that if the Hoffmann industrial 
output index was used instead of the Ritschl (2004) index for Germany, the puzzle 
largely disappeared. In this case, the time series projection more or less agreed with 
the direct benchmark estimate for 1907, with broadly equal labour productivity in 
Britain and Germany. Hence when faced with a choice between the Ritschl (2004) 
and Hoffmann (1965) indices, international comparative considerations dictate that 
Hoffmann should be preferred to Ritschl. 
 
  Ritschl (2008) is clearly uncomfortable with this conclusion, since he and 
others have been highly critical of the German historical national accounts produced 
by Hoffmann (1965), from which the industrial production index is taken (Fremdling, 
1988; 2007a; Ritschl and Spoerer, 1997). Ritschl (2008) now proposes some further 
changes to the German industrial output index, which move it closer to the Hoffmann 
(1965) index, and thus reduce the scale of the discrepancy with the Broadberry and 
Burhop (2007) benchmark for 1907. However, to remove the remaining discrepancy, 
Ritschl (2008) proposes a number of amendments to the 1907 benchmark, which have 
the effect of raising the German labour productivity lead in 1907 from the 5 per cent 
found by Broadberry and Burhop (2007) to a range of 20-28 per cent. But this would 
be very difficult to square with the evidence on wages and the other nominal 
indicators which underpinned the approach of Fremdling (1991), to which Broadberry 
and Burhop (2007: 330-332) also devoted a section, but which Ritschl (2008) ignores.   4
 
This paper proceeds as follows. In section II we first consider the changes 
proposed by Ritschl (2008) to the Broadberry and Burhop (2007) benchmark for 
1907, since this was the major focus of our earlier paper. Although we accept some 
minor changes, they do not have a major impact on the overall Germany/UK 
comparative productivity level presented in Broadberry and Burhop (2007). For 
manufacturing, which is our primary focus, the changes have the effect of raising the 
German productivity lead from 5.0 per cent to 8.4 per cent. Hence in section III we go 
on to critically evaluate the changes to the German manufacturing output index 
proposed by Ritschl (2008), something which we did not attempt in our earlier paper.  
 
Although we agree with Ritschl that it is possible to construct an index of 
output in metal processing from component sub-indices of output, we show that his 
claims of a radical effect on the overall index for manufacturing output depends on his 
weighting procedure. Using the weighting scheme suggested by Fremdling and 
Stäglin’s (2003) corrections to sectoral value added in the 1936 production census, 
together with Fremdling’s (2007a) revised employment figured for 1933 and 1925, we 
show that the long term trends in labour productivity in manufacturing and total 
industry remain much as suggested by Hoffmann (1965) between 1907 and 1936, 
although German productivity was somewhat lower in 1925 than Hoffmann thought. 
This means that the picture of broadly equal labour productivity in British and 
German manufacturing which emerges from the 1907 benchmark is confirmed by 
time series projection from the 1935/36 benchmark, as in Broadbery and Burhop 
(2007). Section IV returns to the wider context of nominal income levels in Britain 
and Germany before World War I, while section V offers some concluding comments.   5
 
II. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE 1907 BENCHMARK 
Ritschl (2008) proposes a number of changes to the Broadberry and Burhop (2007) 
benchmark for 1907, which taken together, have the effect of increasing the German 
labour productivity lead in manufacturing from 5% to a range of 20-28%. The 
difference is not that large, particularly when set against the US productivity lead over 
Britain of more than 100% in 1907, established by Broadberry (1993; 1997), but it 
does nevertheless mark a shift away from broad equality. It therefore needs to be 
placed under critical scrutiny in this section.  
 
The first basic difference between the Broadberry and Burhop (2007) and 
Ritschl (2008) benchmarks concerns our preference for the German industrial survey 
sources wherever possible. This is important because it means that we can be sure that 
the output and employment refer to the same production units, a really crucial 
requirement for the accurate measurement of labour productivity. In our view, it is not 
worth sacrificing this advantage to obtain data for 1907 rather than 1908 or some 
other alleged benefit of an alternative source of employment data. Also, it should be 
borne in mind that whereas the industrial census data refer to average employment 
during the whole year for which output was recorded, the employment census data 
refer to a single date.  
 
More specifically, the 1907 employment census shows manufacturing 
employment of 5,465,356 in firms with six or more employees on 12 June 1907.
1 The 
industrial census is based on the accident insurance statistics, which show an average 
                                                 
1 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1910: 53), industry groups IV to XIV and XVII.    6
manufacturing employment of 5,867,707 in 1907. Moreover, the accident insurance 
statistics as well as the industrial census data transform this figure into full-time 
equivalent employment of 5,243,800.
2 This indicates that the measurement of 
employment varies substantially among sources and concepts used. In addition, 
coverage of firms and employment differs even on an industry level. For example, the 
1907 employment census gives a total of 14,241 employees in 146 firms with six or 
more employees producing motor vehicles.
3 The industrial census for the same year 
counts 69 firms employing 13,423 full time equivalent employees.
4 Consequently, 
matching employment data from the employment census with output data from the 
industrial census leads to mis-measurement of productivity. Moreover, the matching 
problem becomes more severe when we take into account that the employment census 
was conducted in 1907, whereas most of the output data were collected in 1908-10. 
 
Furthermore, if anything, this reliance on the German industrial surveys is 
likely to bias our benchmark in favour of Germany, since these surveys excluded the 
craft sector and most small firms, where productivity was lower than in the large 
industrial firms.  
 
This leads us to consider a second point, which is the correction applied by 
Ritschl (2008) to allow for the difference in benchmark years between Britain and 
Germany. To ensure consistency of sources for output and employment, we used data 
for 1908 and 1910 for some German industries. Ritschl (2008: 18) argues that this 
biases our results against Germany on the grounds that these industries went into 
recession after 1907. Yet it is clear from Hoffmann’s (1965) data on both output and 
                                                 
2 Reichsversicherungsamt (1909: 10), industry groups II to VI and VII to XIII.  
3 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1910: 55), industry group VI c 3.  
4 Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1913: 65).    7
employment that labour productivity continued to increase after 1907, so that our use 
of later years for Germany must bias the benchmark in favour of Germany. We 
pointed this out in the text of Broadberry and Burhop (2007: 322) and repeat it here. 
For manufacturing as a whole, German labour productivity in 1908 was 2.7 per cent 
higher than in 1907, while by 1910 it was 6.0 per cent higher than in 1907 
(Broadberry, 1997: 43). Labour productivity also increased in each year between 1907 
and 1910 in chemicals and metal processing, the industries specifically mentioned by 
Ritschl (Hoffmann, 1965: 196-198, 392). Ritschl (2008: 20) nevertheless somehow 
manages to find that German productivity was lower in the later years, so that 
applying his cyclical adjustment raises the German productivity lead from 5 per cent 
to 12 per cent, or about one-third of his total proposed adjustment. This is wholly 
inappropriate, and any adjustment would have to be in the opposite direction. 
 
  Ritschl (2008: 20) draws attention to the issue of multi-product firms, and 
asserts that this leads us to overstate employment in Germany because not all workers 
were producing the final product. However, the direction of the bias is unclear. If 
workers were allocated to the industry in which they were mainly engaged, then for 
any particular industry there would be both included workers who were not producing 
wholly for that industry (hence leading to an understatement of productivity) and 
output produced by workers who were allocated to other industries (hence leading to 
an overstatement of productivity). Any gain in precision by turning to the alternative 
occupational census data will be offset by a loss of precision by giving up the 
common source for the employment and output data. And for industry as a whole, any 
increase in productivity in one branch must surely be offset by a decrease in another 
branch, since the net effect of reallocating labour across multi-product firms must be   8
zero. This spurious adjustment adds another 8 percentage points to the German 
productivity advantage. 
 
  Ritschl (2008: 22) also proposes an adjustment to take account of the smaller 
cut-off-point in the size of firms in the German occupation census. This adds another 
8 percentage points to the German productivity lead, which is completely out of line 
with similar adjustments for other comparisons, including that of Fremdling et al. 
(2007a) for the 1935/36 Anglo-German benchmark. But, more importantly, the 
adjustment is totally unwarranted, since, as noted earlier, we relied mainly on the 
industrial surveys, which had a higher cut-off point than the British production 
census. If anything, the adjustment should be in the other direction, but in any case 
much, much smaller.  
 
  Nevertheless, Ritschl (2008) does provide a useful critical survey of our 
estimates for particular industries, and we have taken on board some of his 
suggestions. As a result, we provide an updated version of our 1907 benchmark in 
Table 1, together with our original estimates and Ritschl’s proposed revisions. The 
changes which we have made in response to Ritschl’s critical evaluation are limited to 
four industries, cotton, cement, salt mining and iron ore mining, and details are 
provided in Appendix 1, together with a detailed commentary on Ritschl’s proposed 
changes for other industries. The overall effect is to raise the Germany/UK labour 
productivity lead in 1907 from 5 per cent in our original study to 8.4 percent. This 
remains some distance from the 20-28 per cent lead suggested by Ritschl (2008).  
 
III. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE GERMAN PRODUCTION INDEX   9
We are thus persuaded that the problem lies in the industrial production series 
presented by Ritschl (2008). His latest revisions to the production index presented in 
Ritschl (2004) reduce the scale of the discrepancy that we pointed to in our earlier 
paper, but they do not eliminate it. We thus turn our attention now to a detailed 
critical appraisal of Ritschl’s (2004; 2008) work on the German production index. 
 
We proceed to modify the Hoffmann index in three ways. First, we 
incorporate the revisions made by Fremdling et al. (2007a, 2007b) to the 1936 
benchmark estimate of German industrial net value added. Second, we employ 
Fremdling’s (2007a) revised estimates of industrial employment. These changes are in 
line with the direction of change between Ritschl (2004) and Ritschl (2008). Third, we 
incorporate Ritschl’s (2004) modifications regarding the output of the metal 
processing industry during the inter-war period. However, crucially, we employ a 
weighting scheme for metal processing which is consistent with the revised weighting 
scheme used for combining metal processing with the rest of manufacturing.  
 
Hoffmann’s (1965) industrial production index is based on physical output 
series for all industrial branches except the metal processing industry, which covers a 
large swathe of industry, including mechanical and electrical engineering, motor 
vehicle production, shipbuilding and aircraft production. Time series of physical 
output are combined into an industrial production index by multiplying them with a 
weighting matrix. The weights for each industrial branch are calculated as the product 
of the net value added per employee of this branch in 1936 and its employment in 
1907 (weights for the years 1896-1925) and 1933 (weights for the period 1925-59), 
respectively. Recent work by Fremdling and his co-authors has shown that   10
Hoffmann’s estimates regarding the 1936 labour productivity as well as his 1933 
employment figures are distorted. Incorporating Fremdling et al.’s (2007a) and 
Fremdling’s (2007a) labour productivity and labour force estimates yields the 
weighting matrix for the manufacturing output index displayed in Table 2.  
 
In addition, Ritschl (2004: 214) proposes a substantial modification to 
Hoffmann’s output index for the metal processing industry. Hoffmann’s index for this 
branch was not based on physical output data, but rested, rather, on labour income 
data and the assumption of a constant labour income share. Ritschl (2004) argues that 
the assumption of a constant labour share is implausible and proposes a new output 
index for the metal processing industry. Ritschl (2004) uses sales data for mechanical 
engineering, electrical engineering, and motor vehicles as well as physical output data 
for shipbuilding. Ritschl (2008) also makes an allowance for the rapid expansion of 
aircraft production from 1933. We agree with the basic procedure employed by 
Ritschl and also utilise his sales and output data. However, Ritschl (2004: 214) 
aggregates the sub-indices into the output index for the metal processing industry 
using a different weighting scheme from that used in the rest of the industrial 
production index. First, Ritschl combines output of the mechanical and electrical 
engineering industries using gross output in 1913 as weights. Second, the resulting 
index for mechanical and electrical engineering is combined with the sub-indices for 
motor vehicle production and shipbuilding using 1928 weights. Third, the new metal 
processing industry index is incorporated into Hoffmann’s (1965) industrial 
production index using Hoffmann’s 1933/36 weights.  
   11
We adopt a more uniform weighting procedure. In a first step, since the metal 
processing industry is to be combined with other industries using 1933/36 weights for 
the period after 1925 and 1907/36 weights for the period 1895-1925, we apply a 
similar procedure to the construction of the output index for metal processing. Again, 
the corrected value added and employment data of Fremdling et al. (2007b) and 
Fremdling (2007a) are used. The time series and weights for mechanical engineering, 
electrical engineering, motor vehicle production, aircraft production, and shipbuilding 
are displayed in Table 3. The series are reported here with 1933 set equal to 100, 
because although we lack a complete series for aircraft production, we include an 
index based on the growth of employment between 1933 and 1936, for comparability 
with Ritschl (2008). Converting the overall index for metal processing to a 1913 base 
for ease of comparison with the literature, the new index of metal processing output 
takes a value of 95.9 in 1925 compared with Hoffmann’s index value of 1925 = 131.4. 
On the other hand, the new index is somewhat higher than Ritschl’s (2004) index, 
which had a level of 1925 = 84.4.  
 
In a second step, we incorporate the new index for the metal processing 
industry from Table 3 into a new index for manufacturing output in Germany for the 
period 1895-1938, using the new weighting scheme from Table 2. The new index of 
manufacturing output and Hoffmann’s original index are presented in Appendix 2 and 
plotted in Figure 1. Our recalculation of manufacturing output confirms qualitatively 
one of Ritschl’s (2004) central results, that manufacturing/industrial output was lower 
during the interwar period than suggested by Hoffmann’s figures. Furthermore, the 
decline in industrial/manufacturing output during World War I and the hyperinflation 
period was larger than Hoffmann’s figures suggest.   12
 
According to the new index, by 1936 output was nearly 13 per cent lower than 
Hoffmann believed. However, this does not translate into a 13 per cent effect on 
labour productivity, because the new output weights are derived from changes to the 
employment data. This, in turn, has implications for the main focus of this paper, the 
comparative Germany/UK manufacturing labour productivity level during the first 
half of the twentieth century. Since Fremdling (2007a) provides employment data 
only for employment census years, we cannot now calculate a full time series of 
comparative productivity and focus instead on 1925, 1933 and 1936. In addition, we 
calculate a time-series projection for 1907 using Hoffmann’s (1965: 196) data for that 
year, having checked that they are consistent with the employment census for 1907 
(Kaiserliches Statistishes Amt, 1910). The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Starting from the widely accepted Germany/UK comparative labour 
productivity level in manufacturing of 102 in 1936, the new time series projection for 
1907 of 112.5 is quite close to our new 1907 benchmark estimate of comparative 
manufacturing labour productivity of 108.4, and certainly well within the 10% margin 
of error which is usual in this type of work. For 1925, the new projections show a 
comparative productivity level of 93.4, only slightly below Broadberry’s (1997) 
estimate of 95.2. Similarly, the new projection for 1933 of 98.5 is only slightly lower 
than Broadberry’s (1997) estimate of 100.6. What happens here is that over the long 
period 1907 to 1936, Hoffmann’s over-estimation of output growth is partly cancelled 
out by his over-estimation of employment growth, so that the long run comparative 
labour productivity picture is much as suggested by Broadberry (1997). 
   13
Thus, taking account of Ritschl’s (2008) sub-indices of output within the metal 
processing sector, but weighting them in a consistent fashion, and incorporating 
Fremdling’s (2007a) revisions to employment in the interwar period, we arrive at time 
series projections which are entirely consistent with the two benchmark estimates for 
1935/36 and 1907. All the evidence thus points squarely to roughly equal 
manufacturing labour productivity in Britain and Germany during the first half of the 
twentieth century, the main conclusion of Broadberry and Burhop (2007).  
 
IV. NOMINAL INCOMES  
Finally, it is worth emphasising a further point. As well as consistency between the 
benchmarks and the time series projections, it is important to demonstrate consistency 
with the information on nominal incomes in Britain and Germany before 1914. This is 
an issue which Ritschl (2008) simply does not address, but which formed a whole 
section of Broadberry and Burhop (2007: 330-332). Since Ritschl (2008) does not 
challenge us on this evidence, we do not repeat it here, but provide additional 
evidence in a more direct form. This evidence is entirely independent of the historical 
national accounting framework. 
 
  The Board of Trade (1908) conducted an enquiry into wages and the cost of 
living in Germany in 1905, and made a direct comparison between Britain and 
Germany in that year. The money wages were converted at the exchange rate and then 
adjusted for PPP by comparing prices converted at the exchange rate. Table 8 sets out 
the weekly money wages for a number of industrial trades, including the engineering 
and printing trades in manufacturing. For the average of these trades, the Board of 
Trade found German wages to be 83 per cent of the British level, although the average   14
was somewhat higher in engineering. Indeed, for unskilled labourers, the weekly 
money wage was the same in the two countries. Since the Board of Trade found the 
price level to be higher in Germany, this translated unambiguously into a higher real 
wage in Britain.  
 
  Given the lower money wages in Germany, it is difficult to see how labour 
productivity could have been much higher in Germany. This is particularly true in 
industries like cotton textiles, where Britain remained highly competitive in world 
markets right through to the outbreak of World War I. As Broadberry and Burhop 
(2007) argued, the nominal income data can just about be stretched to be consistent 
with broadly equal labour productivity in Britain and Germany at this time. A 
substantial German labour productivity lead simply does not seem credible. 
 
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In this paper, we reaffirm the central claim of Broadberry and Burhop (2007) that 
manufacturing labour productivity was broadly equal in Britain and Germany during 
the first half of the twentieth century. We first reject Ritschl’s (2008) attempt to revise 
our 1907 benchmark substantially upwards. Although we accept one or two of 
Ritschl’s (2008) criticisms of our original benchmark, these have the effect of 
increasing it only from 105.0 to 108.4, still a long way from the range of 120-128 
claimed by Ritschl.  
 
The second part of this paper then provides a critical appraisal of Ritschl’s 
new index of manufacturing output. We are able to accept the sub-indices for the 
individual parts of the metal processing sector that Ritschl proposes, but apply a   15
consistent weighting procedure. Although this leads to somewhat slower growth of 
output than in the original Hoffmann (1965) index, the scale of the revision is more 
modest than that suggested by Ritschl. Furthermore, Hoffmann’s overstatement of the 
growth of manufacturing output was partly offset by an equivalent overstatement of 
the growth of employment, as noted by Fremdling (2007a). The net effect of the 
changes to output and employment is to change the long run path of labour 
productivity in German manufacturing only slightly from that claimed by Hoffmann 
(1965). Hence the main finding of Broadberry and Burhop (2007), that labour 
productivity was broadly equal in British and German manufacturing during the first 
half of the twentieth century, is upheld. There is no Anglo-German industrial 
productivity puzzle for the period 1895-1935: time series projection from the 1935/36 
benchmark is perfectly consistent with the 1907 benchmark, even if Hoffmann’s 
(1965) series for metal processing is replaced. Finally, we note that Ritschl’s (2008) 
view of substantially higher German industrial labour productivity in 1907 would be 
hard to square with the evidence of nominal incomes in the two countries. 
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Ritschl   Revised 
Broadberry-
Burhop
General chemicals  126.6 134.3 126.6
Coke 98.9 123.5 98.9
CHEMICALS & ALLIED  113.9 130.5 113.9
Iron & steel  137.8 144.0 137.8
Non-ferrous metals  157.9 221.5 157.9
Motor vehicles  89.7 135.2 89.7
METALS & ENGINEERING  139.2 152.1 139.2
Cotton 85.6 128.4 87.3
Silk 74.9 93.7 74.9
Leather 67.8 100.8 67.8
TEXTILES & CLOTHING  82.3 121.7 83.6
Brewing 90.5 102.7 90.5
Tobacco 28.3 38.4 28.3
Sugar 47.3 47.3 47.3
FOOD, DRINK & TOBACCO  66.9 73.0 66.9
Cement 108.1 124.2 124.1
OTHER MANUFACTURING  108.1 124.1
TOTAL MANUFACTURING  105.0 128.0 108.4
 
Salt mining  57.8 130.1 106.8
Coal mining  78.5 95.5 78.5
Iron ore mining  91.0 129.8 77.0
MINING 78.7 97.9 77.7
TOTAL INDUSTRY  101.8 124.5 104.7
 
Sources: Broadberry and Burhop (2007: 321); Ritschl (2008: Table 7); Appendix 1. 
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Col. 2: 1936 
employment




Col. 4: 1933 
employment 
Col. 5: 1907 
employment
Col. 6: Index 
weight for 
1925-59
Col. 7: Index 
weight for 
1896-1925
Building materials  1,178,260 355,374 3,316 401,000  822,000 4.49% 8.14%
Ferrous and non-ferrous 
iron and steel trades  4,764,873 1,079,853 4,413 389,000 5.13%
Engineering, shipbuilding, 







Chemical and allied trades  2,419,791 285,151 8,486 298,000 229,000 8.55% 5.80%
Textile trades  2,831,552 906,187 3,125 857,000 1,087,000 9.05% 10.14%
Leather trades  402,611 92,946 4,332 48,000  59,000 0.70% 0.76%
Clothing trades  1,075,729 350,110 3,073 1,117,000  1,527,000 11.60% 14.01%
Timber trade  952,451 323,009 2,949 607,000  894,000 6.05% 7.87%
Paper, printing, and 
stationary trades  1,509,823 371,910 4,060 188,000 242,000 2.58% 2.93%
Food, drink, and tobacco 
trades  3,543,298 549,244 6,451 1,419,000 1,238,000 30.94% 23.85%
Total / Average  24,856,280 5,699,168 4,361 6,671,000  8,092,000 100% 100%
 
Sources: Col. 1 and 2: Fremdling et al. (2007a: 368); Col. 3: = Col.1 / Col. 2; Col. 4: Fremdling (2007: 178); Col. 5: Hoffmann (1965: 196); Col. 6 =Col. 3 
* Col.4; Col. 7 = Col.3 * Col.5. 1925/ 59 weights for metal production (11.34 %) and metal processing (14.70 %) according to their relative net output in 
1936. 
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TABLE 3: Output index for German metal processing, 1913-1938 (1933=100) 
 





vehicles  Aircrafts Shipbuilding Total 
1933 
weights  56.94% 31.21%  10.00%  0.70  % 1.86% 100.00% 
1907 
weights  70.48% 19.53% 4.92%  0.00  % 5.07% 100.00% 
1913  219.8 133.3 24.5   885.0  158.7
1925  151.6 156.1 80.6   549.6  152.2
1926  129.0 130.9 67.4   523.0  130.7
1927  169.0 169.2 114.2   567.3  170.9
1928  214.9 209.2 136.5   646.0  213.3
1929  219.3 222.1 136.8   659.3  220.1
1930  169.7 167.1 98.6   479.6  167.5
1931  126.4 132.8 78.0   225.7  125.4
1932  85.7 94.5 57.8   112.4  86.1
1933  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0
1934  133.4 137.9 147.6   236.3  138.1
1935  176.0 164.1 199.4   544.2  181.5
1936  214.1 181.6 238.4 1,939.9  701.8  227.4
1937  268.6 200.0 281.7   791.2  258.1
1938  321.1 256.0 344.3   780.5  311.6
 
Sources: Weights: 1936 value added and employment from Fremdling et al. (2007b); 
1933 employment from Statistisches Reichsamt (1937). 1907 employment from 
Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1910). Time series: mechanical and electrical 
engineering from Ritschl (2004: 214), Fremdling (2007c); motor vehicles and 
shipbuilding from Hoffmann (1965:358); aircraft from Fremdling et al. (2007b) and 
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Sources: Hoffmann (1965); Appendix 2. 
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TABLE 4: Projections of Germany/UK comparative labour productivity in 
manufacturing 
 
 1907 1925  1933  1936
UK index of manufacturing output (1913=100)  88.8 111.8  119.6  155.7
UK index of manufacturing employment 
(1913=100) 
93.0 93.4 89.4  101.1
UK index of manufacturing labour productivity 
(1936=100) 
62.0 77.7 86.9  100.0
German index of manufacturing output (1913=100)  76.6 96.1  78.6  121.4
German index of manufacturing employment 
(1913=100) 
92.6 111.8 77.6  100.5
German index of manufacturing labour productivity 
(1936=100) 
68.4 71.1 83.8  100.0
Comparative Germany/UK manufacturing labour 
productivity (UK=100) 
112.5 93.4 98.5  102.0
 
Sources: UK output and employment indices from Broadberry (1997: 43-44). German 
output index: own calculation, see text. German employment own calculations using 
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TABLE 5: Predominant weekly money wages in British and German Industry, 
1905 
 




Ratio of mean 
predominant wage 
(Britain = 100)
Building trades   
Bricklayers  26s. 11d. to 31s. 3d. 37s. 6d. to 40s. 6d. 75 
Masons  26s. 11d. to 31s. 3d. 37s. 2d. to 39s. 4d. 75 
Carpenters  26s. 11d. to 31s. 3d. 36s. 2d. to 39s. 4d. 77 
Plumbers  24s. to 28s. 6d.  35s. 4d. to 39s. 9d. 70 
Painters  24s. to 29s. 8d  31s. 6d. to 37s. 6d. 78 
Labourers  19s. 6d. to 24s.  23s. 6d. to 27s.  86 
Engineering trades      
Fitters  26s. to 32s.  32s. to 36s.  85 
Turners  27s. to 33s.  32s. to 36s.  88 
Smiths  28s. 6d. to 33s.  32s. to 36s.  90 
Patternmakers  25s. 6d. to 35s.  34s. to 38s.  77 
Labourers  18s. to 22s.  18s. to 22s.  100 
Printing trade      
Compositors  24s. 9d. to 25s. 11d. 28s. to 33s.  83 




Source: Board of Trade (1908: xliv). 
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APPENDIX 1: INDUSTRY LEVEL DETAILS FOR 1907 BENCHMARK 
 
In this section we set out our response to Ritschl’s (2008) detailed commentary on our 
data for individual industries included in the 1907 benchmark. For a general 
overview, see the main text. 
 
1. General chemicals 
Ritschl uses 1907 output data from Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1909: 99) and 
1907 census of occupation data from Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1910). This has 
only a very small effect on the comparative productivity level. We prefer to retain the 
advantage of taking the output and employment data from the same source.  
 
2. Coke 
Ritschl mentions the inclusion of other products in the German data, but we have 
already allowed for this by adjusting employment down in line with the share of coke 
in the value of output. Again, using occupation census data means giving up the 
advantage of taking output and employment from the same source. Furthermore, since 
productivity increased between 1907 and 1908, this produces a small upward rather 
than downward bias to German productivity in our estimate. 
 
3. Iron and steel 
Ritschl prefers to use 1907 data for Germany and to use physical output rather than 
deflating net output. His results are nevertheless almost identical to ours. The finding 
that the results are almost identical follow from the very similar shares of net output 
in gross output in the two countries, which was already apparent in our data set. 
Again, we prefer to retain output and employment data from the same source. 
 
4. Non-ferrous metals 
This was already the industry with the biggest German labour productivity lead in our 
sample. The key to productivity comparisons is careful matching of products, which is 
why we restricted our analysis to unwrought copper and unrefined zinc. For the other 
products which Ritschl suggests using, we found implausible PPPs, suggestive of 
poor matching. We prefer to take our output and employment data from a single 
source.  
 
5. Motor vehicles 
Broadberry and Burhop (2007: 338) stated clearly in the appendix that the German 
data for motor vehicles are for 1909, but omitted to change this in the text, since in an 
earlier version we had used the 1907 volumes. However, since the value and unit 
price data are only available for 1909, we preferred to use the data from that year for 
consistency. Again, to ensure that we are dealing with output and employment from 
the same firms, we used the 1909 employment data from the industrial survey. 
 
6. Cotton 
Ritschl (2008) suggests that Germany had a substantial labour productivity lead over 
Britain in cotton in 1907. But if this were the case, it is hard to see how Britain could 
have been so dominant in export markets (including Germany), despite paying higher 
wages. Leunig (2003) argues that if anything, Broadberry (1997) understates British 
productivity in cotton spinning, because of the high quality of the British output. 
Nevertheless, Ritschl (2008: 34) rightly points to a mistake in our spreadsheet, where   23
employment in “Bigognespinnerei” was mis-transcribed as 9493 instead of 6493. 
Correcting this results in a slightly higher German productivity. However, Ritschl 
misunderstands the nature of the adjustment to allow for the absence of German data 
on cloth. The reduction of employment in line with the share of yarn in the value of 
output was not intended to treat yarn output as a proxy for cloth output, but merely to 
measure productivity in the spinning sector, which is what Ritschl (2008: 19) says he 
is aiming to do. The corrected data are shown below: 
 
 U.K.  Germany 
 Units Values Units  Values 
Output volume  000 lb 1,487,367 000 kg  358,935 
Output value   £000 78,304 M000  644,464 
Unit value  £ per lb 0.05 M per kg  1,80 
Industry output value  £000 174,610 M000  644,464 
Industry employment  000 572.062 000  156.432 
Adjusted employment  000 256.542 000  156.432 
Output per employee  lb 5,798    
Output per employee  kg 2,630 kg  2,295 
 
Comparing output per employee of 2,295 kg in Germany with 2,630 kg in the United 
Kingdom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 87.3. 
German data are for 1907, compared with out earlier estimate of 85.6.  
 
Sources: UK: Board of Trade (1912: 337-339); Germany, output: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt (1909: 80; 1910: 253-254; Germany, employment: Kaiserliches 
Statistisches Amt (1913: 69). 
 
7. Silk 
As in cotton, we adjusted the British employment data in line with the share of yarn in 
the value of output, which is the appropriate way of dealing with the absence of 
volume data on cloth output. A narrower focus on the German spinning data would 
lower the German productivity, since spinning accounted for a lower share of the 
weight of total silk output than its share of total silk employment. It is therefore 
surprising that Ritschl adjusts the German productivity position upwards. 
 
8. Leather 
Ritschl (2008: 35) claims that the British data refer only to tanned leather, but this is 
not the case. The reason for the incomplete coverage of the industry is that some of 
the output was recorded in square feet, dozens or yards. Furthermore, we already 
adjusted the British employment data to take account of this incomplete coverage. As 




The British data have already been adjusted to take account of the other activities such 
as bottling, by reducing employment in line with the share of matched output in total 
output. We prefer to stick with the German employment and output data from the 
same source. The adjustments suggested by Ritschl are in any case quite small. 
 
10. Tobacco   24
The adjustments suggested by Ritschl for this sector are quite small. We prefer to 
stick with our estimates which take output and employment from the same sources, 
which do not include the small firms for which Ritschl suggests making allowance. 
 
11. Sugar 
Ritschl does not propose any adjustments for this industry. 
 
12. Cement 
Ritschl suggests that German productivity is pulled down by the inclusion of quarry 
workers. Excluding these workers from the comparison raises the comparative 
Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio to 124.1, rather than the 108.1 in Broadberry 
and Burhop (2007).  
 
13. Salt mining 
The British data refer to “the production of salt at mines and brine pits and the 
refining of salt at salt works”. We now match this with saleable products from salt 
mining including chlorine potassic works for Germany. The German data are for 
1909. 
 
 U.K.  Germany 
 Units Values Units  Values 
Output volume  000 tons 1,278 000 tonnes  5,042 
Output value   £000 650 M000  134,682 
Unit value  £ per ton 0.51 M per tonne  26.71 
Industry output value  £000 667 M000  220,192 
Industry employment  000 4.736 000  27.445 
Adjusted employment  000 4.615 000  16.787 
Output per employee  tons 277    
Output per employee  tonnes 281 tonnes  300 
 
Comparing output per employee of 300 tonnes in Germany with 281 tonnes in the 
United Kingdom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 
106.8. German data are for 1909.  
 




14. Coal mining 
We prefer to use output and employment data from the same source. 
 
15. Iron ore mining 
Ritschl rightly points out that there are additional UK data in Board of Trade (1912: 
76) which were returned under the Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act. However, it 
should be noted that this has the effect of raising rather than reducing the British 
productivity advantage. We retain the German data for 1908 to ensure that output and 
employment are for the same firms. The revised data are as follows: 
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 U.K.  Germany 
 Units Values Units  Values 
Output volume  000 tons 6,802 000 tonnes  18,830 
Output value   £000 1,987 M000  84,275 
Unit value  £ per ton 0.29 M per tonne  4.48 
Industry output value  £000 1,999 M000  84,275 
Industry employment  000 11.252 000  39.594 
Adjusted employment  000 11.184 000  39.594 
Output per employee  tons 608    
Output per employee  tonnes 618 tonnes  476 
 
Comparing output per employee of 476 tonnes in Germany with 618 tonnes in the 
United Kingdom yields a comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity ratio of 77.0, 
compared with our earlier estimate of 91.0. German data are for 1908.  
 
Sources: UK: Board of Trade (1912: 76); Germany: Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt 
(1913: 2). 
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1895 50.1  51.3
1896 52.6  54.0
1897 53.9  55.3
1898 56.9  58.6
1899 58.6  60.2
1900 58.5  60.1
1901 58.6  60.1
1902 59.7  61.3
1903 63.6  65.5
1904 66.2  68.2
1905 69.0  71.2
1906 71.3  73.8
1907 76.6  79.2
1908 77.6  80.1
1909 79.1  82.0
1910 81.1  85.2
1911 86.8  90.4
1912 94.8  97.2
1913 100.0  100.0
1925 96.1  104.7
1926 88.1  93.8
1927 111.9  120.3
1928 114.2  121.6
1929 116.4  123.6
1930 97.4  109.3
1931 81.0  91.5
1932 70.5  79.7
1933 78.6  87.8
1934 95.6  105.8
1935 108.1  126.5
1936 121.4  139.6
1937 134.7  151.2
1938 151.1  168.5
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